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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction to decide this appeal is conferred upon the Court of Appeals by Sections 
78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Ann., since the Supreme Court has transferred to 
the Court of Appeals this matter over which the Supreme Court had original appellate 
jurisdiction, and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues asserted by Appellant St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. 
Paul") on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether a claim was made that would trigger an obligation or liability of 
Appellee American Casualty Company of Reading PA ("American") under the insurance 
policy it issued to Defendant Troy Alan Broka ("Broka'). The standard of appellate review 
is one of correctness. Arnold Industries v. Love, 63 P.3d 721, 722 (Utah 2002). (See St. 
Paul's Memorandum in Opposition to American's Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
March 25, 2002, hereinafter, "St. Paul's Memorandum," (Record at 374). 
2. Whether St. Paul is precluded from pursuing a subrogation claim 
against American. The standard of appellate review is one of correctness. See Id. at 722. 
3. Whether St. Paul is precluded from pursing a claim of equitable 
contribution against American. The standard of appellate reviev/ is one of correctness. (See 
Id. at 722. 
4. Whether the Third District Court erred in ruling that because no claim was 
made directly against Broka, St. Paul has no subrogation or equitable contribution claims 
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against American. The standard of appellate review is one of correctness. See Id. at 722. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review on appeal from a summary judgment 
ruling in the state district court is a review for correctness with no deference given to the 
district court's legal conclusions. Id. at 722. 
Furthermore, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. Id. at 722. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
By ruling on less than all issues and not reaching issues involving statutory 
provisions, there are no statutory provisions that are determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Background Information 
Broka was employed by Appellant University of Utah Hospital ("Hospital") in April, 
1997. Broka provided nursing care to a Hospital patient, Abel Hepworth ( "Hepworth") in 
April, 1997. In the course of providing such care to Hepworth, Broka allegedly misread a 
physician's order for infusing IV liquids and infused Hepworth with an excessive amount 
of fluids causing Hepworth's death on April 14, 1997. Shortly after Hepworth's death, his 
wife informed the Hospital of her intention, on behalf of herself and her minor children, to 
commence legal action to recover for Hepworth's death. 
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American provided and issued professional liability insurance to Broka. The 
Hospital contacted American regarding the claim asserted by Mrs. Hepworth and invited 
American's participation in settlement negotiations and tendered defense and 
indemnification of Broka to American. American refused to provide coverage to Broka or 
to participate in settlement negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth. 
In settlement negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth, the Hospital settled her claim for 
$1,323,523.00. The Hospital self-insured up to a retention of $1,000,000.00 and paid that 
amount to Mrs. Hepworth in connection with such settlement. Appellant St. Paul provided 
the Hospital with excess liability insurance coverage above $1,000,000.00 and paid the 
remaining $323,523.00 of the settlement to Mrs. Hepworth. 
Upon claims of subrogation and contribution, St. Paul seeks reimbursement from 
American of the amount paid by St. Paul ($323,523.00) in connection with the Hepworth 
settlement that should have been paid by American in connection with its liability policy 
issued to Broka. 
B. The Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 
On February 26, 2002, the Hospital moved for summary judgment against 
American. The Hospital's Motion asserted that the insurance policy issued by American to 
Broka, employed by the Hospital, was the primary insurance policy covering Broka for 
negligence and wrongful death claims brought by third parties. The Hospital sought a 
ruling from the District Court that American was primarily responsible to cover Broka and 
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that American must reimburse the Hospital for monies expended to settle the claim arising 
out of care rendered by Broka. 
On March 1, 2002, American also moved for summary judgment against the 
Hospital and St. Paul. American's Motion asserted that Broka was employed by a 
governmental entity and was acting in the course and scope of his employment in 
providing nursing care to Hepworth, and Broka was afforded immunity from incurring any 
personal liability for an underlying wrongful death claim. American relied for support of 
this argument on Section 63-30-1, Utah Code Ann., the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Accordingly, American asserted that Broka was statutorily protected from having to 
contribute to any settlement the Hospital made for claims within the scope of Broka's 
employment. 
Furthermore, American argued that because Broka would not have been legally 
obligated to pay any amounts in connection with a settlement under any circumstance 
present in the case, coverage under American's policy on Broka never triggered. American 
contends that its policy only provides coverage for amounts that Broka is legally obligated 
to pay. American argues that Broka was never legally obligated to pay, and the Hospital 
and St. Paul are therefore not entitled to subrogation and/or equitable contribution from 
American. 
St. Paul joined in the Hospital's Memorandum Opposing American's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In addition, St. Paul argued that its asserted claim against American 
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for equitable contribution precluded American being awarded summary judgment. 
C. The Third District State Court's Decision. 
On September 6, 2002, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki of the Third District Court 
entertained oral argument with respect to the parties' motions. During the course of such 
oral argument, St. Paul raised the issue of application in this matter of Article I, Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution and argued that such provision renders unconstitutional sections 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act relied upon by American in support of its Motion. 
All parties were allowed the opportunity to folly brief this issue following the hearing. 
On October 7, 2002, the Third District Court issued its Memorandum Decision, 
granting American's Motion for Summary Judgment. The University's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was denied. The District Court concluded that the University 
essentially conceded that Mrs, Hepworth made no "claim" within the meaning of the 
American policy against Broka. The District Court went on to hold that this was critical 
inasmuch as the American's policy was triggered only by a "claim" or an insured's legal 
obligation to pay some amount. Broka never had any claim made directly against him and 
never became legally obligated to pay anything to Ms. Hepworth in connection with the 
Hospital and St. Paul settlement of the Hospital's liability. Consequently, the Court held 
that none of American's obligations under the policy issued to Broka ever matured. 
With respect to St. Paul, the Court held that there can be no claim for contribution 
among insurers unless one insurer was equally obligated to provided coverage to the same 
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insurer for the same risk, yet failed to do so. The District Court went on to hold that the 
obligations triggered by the Hepworth family's demands were those of the Hospital and its 
insurer, St. Paul, for amounts in excess of the Hospital's retained limit. The Hepworths 
made no demand that would have triggered the American Policy. 
In light of the foregoing ruling, the District Court did not reach the issue of the Utah 
Government Immunity Act, nor the constitutional issues surrounding the Act. 
The Hospital and St. Paul now appeal the District Court's Order, to challenge the 
ruling of the District Court for correctness. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 10, 1997, Hepworth was admitted to the Hospital for surgical repair of an 
aneurysm in a cerebral artery. See Hospital's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Statement of Undisputed Facts, ]f no. 3 (hereinafter, "Hospital's 
Memorandum"), Record at 94. Broka was employed by the Hospital as a travel nurse and 
provided nursing care to Hepworth. (Hospital's Memorandum, f^ no. 2, Record at 94). 
In providing care to Hepworth, Broka negligently misread a physician's order for 
the infusion of IV fluids, and infused Hepworth with an excessive amount of fluids at 
500cc per hour instead of lOOcc per hour ordered by Hepworth 's treating physician. 
(Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 3, Record at 94). Consequently, on April 14, 1997, 
Hepworth died as a result of fluid overload from Appellee Broka 's incorrect administration 
of fluids. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 3, Record at 94). 
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American's professional liability insurance to Broka was in effect at all material 
times. (Hospital's Memorandum, % no. 5, Record at 95). Broka's professional liability 
coverage with American provided limited liability, in the event of a claim arising from the 
rendering of professional nursing services by Broka, in the amounts of $1,000,000.00 for 
each medical incident and $3,000,000.00 aggregate. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 5, 
Record at 95). 
Broka's American policy provided professional liability coverage to him for, among 
other things, injury or damage caused by a medical incident arising out of care provided by 
Broka. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 5, Record at 95). 
The Hospital self-insured its employees with professional liability insurance with 
Coverage up to $1,000,000.00 per occurrence. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 8, Record 
at 96). St. Paul provided the Hospital with excess liability insurance coverage above the 
Hospital $1,000,000.00 per occurrence self-retention amount. (See St. Paul's Amended 
Complaint, f no. 8, Record at *). Broka's professional liability insurance with 
American is an excess insurance policy, or, in the alternative, is an escape insurance policy. 
St. Paul provided to the Hospital, excess liability insurance coverage. (St. Paul's Amended 
Complaint, J^ no. 101). The Hospital provided primary liability insurance coverage to 
lFor some reason St. Paul's Complaint and Amended Complaint were not 
included in the record prepared by the clerk in the District Court's office. Therefore, a 
page citation to the record cannot be included. The clerk's office has been notified of 
this oversight, and a copy of St. Paul's Amended Complaint is included in the Addendum 
to this brief. 
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Broka. (St. Paul's Amended Complaint, % no. 101) St. Paul and American provided 
secondary liability insurance coverage to Broka. (St. Paul's Amended Complaint, f nos. 8 
&101) 
Following the death of Hepworth, the Hospital was informed by his wife, Susan 
Hepworth, acting individually and on behalf of the Hepworth's two minor children, Alex 
Hepworth and Ammon Hepworth, that she intended to commence a lawsuit against the 
Hospital and Broka based on the care provided to her husband by Broka. (Hospital's 
Memorandum, % no. 4, Record at 94). Prior to commencing the lawsuit, Mrs. Hepworth 
initiated settlement negotiations with the Hospital. (Hospital's Memorandum, f^ no. 4, 
Record at 94). 
On or about June 11, 1997, counsel for the Hospital informed American of the facts 
involving Broka and invited American's participation in the settlement negotiations with 
Mrs. Hepworth. (Hospital's Memorandum, Tf no. 9, Record at 96 and 152). By letter dated 
July 17, 1997, American declined to participate in settlement negotiations with Mrs. 
Hepworth. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 11, Record at 97). 
Because Broka was an agent of the Hospital, and because his negligence caused Mr. 
Hepworth's death, the Hepworth family's claims were subsequently settled by the Hospital 
and St. Paul. (St. Paul's Amended Complaint, U no. 191). As part of such settlement, the 
Hospital paid to the Hepworths $1,000,000.00, and St. Paul paid to the Hepworths 
$325,523. (St. Paul's Amended Complaint, % no. 201). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
American's policy for excess insurance on Broka was triggered by a claim made 
directly by the Hospital to American. American had a duty to provide coverage and 
participate in the Hepworth settlement with the Hospital and St. Paul. Sound public policy 
and a great weight of legal authority suggest that an insurer may receive notice of a claim 
from sources other than the insured in order to trigger coverage. In this case, such notice 
came from the primary insurer-Hospital to an excess insurer-American. Notice of a claim 
from a source other than the insured is proper where notice of a claim involves a demand 
for money against the insured involving a medical incident under the terms of the insurer's 
policy, timely notice is given by a third party source to the insurer, notice of the claim does 
not prejudice the insurer, and the notice allows the insurer adequate time to investigate the 
claim to protect itself. Thus, the District Court's decision is incorrect and should be 
overturned. 
St. Paul's right to equitable contribution is not a matter of contract, but stems for 
equitable principles designed to accomplish ultimate justice in the bearing of a specific 
burden where two insurers provide excess coverage to the same insured for the same risk. 
The right of contribution belongs to St. Paul individually. It is not based on any right of 
subrogation to the rights of Broka, and it is not equivalent to "standing in the shoes" of 
Broka. Therefore, St. Paul is entitled to equitable contribution from American in an 
amount to be determined at the trial court level. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. AMERICAN'S POLICY FOR EXCESS INSURANCE WAS TRIGGERED 
BY A CLAIM MADE DIRECTLY BY THE HOSPITAL TO AMERICAN. 
American's policy for excess insurance coverage on Broka was triggered by notice 
of a claim which American first received from the Hospital It should make no difference 
that a demand was not first made directly on Broka. Under the American policy, a claim is 
defined as follows: 
IV ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
"Claim" means the receipt by you [insured] of a demand for money or services 
naming you and alleging a medical incident. 
(Record at 133 emphasis in original, brackets added). 
Accordingly, the insured is generally obligated to promptly inform the insurer when 
a demand for money is made against the insurer involving a medical incident. Further, 
under the American policy, the insured is obligated to report a claim once the insured is 
aware of, or reasonably believes that, there may be a claim asserted against the insured. A 
"claim," as above-defined by the American policy, means a demand for money alleging a 
medical incident. The American policy does not define a claim as being triggered by the 
insured's legal obligation to pay some amount to a person injured or damaged by the 
insured in a medical incident. In other words, the insured is not obligated to give notice of 
a claim to American only when he becomes legally obligated to pay such claim. Prompt 
notice of a claim should be given once demand for money involving a medical incident is 
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made. The American policy does not specify or limit from whom American must receive 
such a demand. Often such a demand comes from the insured, but not always, and not 
necessarily so. 
An insurance company may learn of a claim or a potential claim against the insured 
from a source other than the insured. In states that require a showing of prejudice before 
coverage can be denied because of a breach of the notice provision of an insurance policy, 
such third party notice should be deemed to satisfy the insured's notice requirement. See 
generally Hanson v, Barmore, 779 P.2d 1360, 1362-63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Standard 
Oil Co, v. Hawaiian Ins, & Guar, Co., 654 P.2d 1345, 1348 n4 (Haw. 1982) (notice 
received from other insured under policy was sufficient); McLaughlin v. Attorney 's Title 
Guar. Fund, 378 N.E.2d 355, 360 (111.1978) ("where the insurance company has actual 
notice of the loss or receives the necessary information from some other source, there is no 
prejudice to the insurer from the failure of the insured to give notice of the claim "); Bibb v. 
Dairyland Ins, Co,, 205 N.W.2d 495, 496 (MI. 1973) (notice received from insured party's 
attorney was sufficient); Great Am. Ins, v. CG Tate Constr. Co., 265 S.E.2d 467, 472 
(N.C.1980) (it does not matter from what source the insurance company eventually 
receives notice); Lusch v, Aetna Cas, Sur, Co,, 538 P.2d 902, 904 (Or. 1975) (insurer is not 
prejudice by insured's failure to give timely notice if "a third party notifies the insurer in 
time for the insurer to adequately investigate the claim and protect itself")- This same 
principle should apply by analogy to this case and the demand made by the Hospital upon 
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American even though a demand was never made directly on nurse Broka. 
Prompt notice of a claim should be given to the insurer in order that the insurer may 
have an opportunity to acquire, through adequate investigation, full information about the 
circumstances of a claim so that the insurer can protect itself. It should make no difference 
whether notice of the claim is made directly upon the insured by demand letter, initiation 
of formal legal proceedings against the insured or the like, or whether notice of the claim is 
made directly upon the insurer from some source other than the insured. This is especially 
true in this case where St. Paul raises a claim of equitable contribution against American 
and does not stand in the shoes of Broka in order to seek such contribution from American. 
In this case, American received prompt notice of the claim against Broka from the 
Hospital within two months following Hep worth's death. American had every opportunity 
to investigate and acquire full information about the circumstances of the claim. American 
simply chose not to participate in settlement following receipt of notice of the claim from 
the Hospital American was not prejudiced simply because it received notice of the claim 
from the Hospital and not Broka. 
Consequently, it makes no reasonable sense to require that a demand for money 
alleging a medical incident must first be sent by the injured party to the insured, who is 
then obligated to pass notice of the claim on to the insurer, rather than the injured party 
sending notice of the claim directly to the insurer. Such a requirement suggests that a 
person injured or damaged by a medical incident must possess a foreknowledge of the 
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contract language of the insured's insurance policy which instructs that a demand must 
first be made directly upon the insured. A person injured or damaged by an insured rarely, 
if ever, has access to the insured's insurance policy in order for the person to determine 
how and to whom such a demand should be made. It is unreasonable, contrary to sound 
public policy, and against the greater weight of legal authority that an insurer such as 
American be alleviated from its obligation to pay out on a claim for a related medical 
incident involving one of its insureds where the insurer has collected a premium from its 
insured, insured a risk, received prompt notice of the claim, and has been allowed the 
opportunity to thoroughly investigate that claim, simply because notice of the claim was 
made by the Hospital to American rather than to Broka himself. 
Timely notice of the claim was given to American. American had every opportunity 
to investigate the claim in order to protect itself just as if the claim had been given by 
Broka directly to American. American was not prejudiced by notice from a third party 
other than Broka. Consequently, American had a duty to provide coverage and participate 
in the Hep worth settlement. The District Court's decision is incorrect and should be 
overturned. 
II. CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE CONTRIBUTION. 
St. Paul insured the Hospital and all of its employees, including nurse Broka, with 
excess liability insurance coverage above the Hospital's one million dollars per occurrence 
self-retention amount. St. Paul's limit of liability was five million dollars aggregate. 
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American also insured Broka with a one million dollar limit of liability per each 
"medical incident." American's limit of liability is three million dollars aggregate. Both 
St. Paul and American insured the same insured, Broka, for the same risk. It makes no 
difference that St. Paul also insured other employees of the Hospital under its excess policy 
for similar risks. 
Because both St. Paul and American insured Broka for the same risk, St. Paul is 
entitled to equitable contribution from American for its portion of the loss paid by St. Paul 
to the Hepworths. See Fireman 's Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Casualty Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 
1279(1998). 
St. Paul's right to equitable contribution is not a matter of contract, but stems from 
equitable principles designed to accomplish ultimate justice in the bearing of a specific 
burden where two insurers provide excess coverage to the same insured for the same risk. 
See Id. at 1295. 
The right of equitable contribution belongs to St. Paul individually. It is not based 
on any right of subrogation to the rights of Broka, and it is not equivalent to "standing in 
the shoes" of Broka. Such right to contribution is therefore not limited to traditional 
subrogation defenses or to any argument that Broka, having himself paid no claim, has no 
claim against American. The California Court of Appeals in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 
explained the following with respect to the doctrine of equitable contribution: 
, . . [T]he reciprocal contribution rights of co-
insurers who insure the same risk are based on the 
13 
equitable principal that the burden of indemnifying or 
defending the insured with whom each has independently 
contracted should be borne by all of the insurance 
carriers together, with the loss equitably distributed 
among those who share liability for it in direct ratio to the 
proportion each insurer's coverage bears to the total 
coverage provided by all of the insurance policies. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
St. Paul's claim for equitable contribution is not precluded by any argument that 
American stands in the shoes of Broka, or that Broka has no claim against American, 
because St. Paul is not required to stand in the shoes of Broka or the Hospital with 
respect to Broka's defenses and thus become subject to the defenses. Neither does the 
fact that Gulf Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co. 567 P.2d 158 (Utah 1977), relied upon by 
American, places American in Broka's shoes preclude St. Paul's claim for equitable 
contribution against American. The right of equitable contribution is not derivative and 
is not dependent upon any rights of other parties, including Broka and the Hospital. St. 
Paul's contribution claim is not a claim based upon subrogation to another person 's 
rights, but is a claim arising directly in St. Paul by reason of it having paid a claim for 
which American also had responsibility. 
The Fireman's Fund court stated: 
Equitable contribution is entirely different [from 
subrogation]. It is the right to recover, not from the party 
primarily liable for the loss, but from a co-obligor who shares 
such liability with the party seeking contribution. . . .Where 
multiple insurance carriers insure the same insured and cover 
the same risk, each insurer has independent standing to 
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assert a cause of action against its co-insurers for equitable 
contribution when it has undertaken the defense or 
indemnification of the common insured. Equitable 
contribution permits reimbursement to the insurer that paid 
on the loss for the excess it paid over its proportionate share 
of the obligation, on the theory that the debt it paid was 
equally and concurrently owed by the other insurers and 
should be shared by them pro rata in proportion to their 
respective coverage of the risk. The purpose of this rule of 
equity is to accomplish substantial justice by equalizing 
the common burden shared by coinsurers, and to prevent 
one insurer from profiting at the expense of others. 
Fireman 's Fund, supra 1293. (Emphasis added). 
"Unlike subrogation, the right to equitable contribution exists independently of 
the rights of the insured." Id. at 1295. St. Paul's right to contribution from American 
stems from the fact that St. Paul insured and paid out on an insured and on a risk that 
American also insured and upon St. Paul's independent standing under such 
circumstances to recover contribution directly from American. Therefore, St. Paul is 
entitled to equitable contribution from American in the amount of one-half or 
$162,761.50 of the $325,523.00 paid out by St. Paul on the Hepworth settlement. 
CONCLUSION 
St. Paul is entitled to and requests a ruling of this Court that the District Court's 
decision is incorrect and that American's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
denied. 
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ADDENDUM 
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District Court's Memorandum Decision upon which such Final Order and Judgment are 
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THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota 
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v. 
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BROKA, 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON 
PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CaseNor9S0tm590 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasakd 
Plaintiffs University of Utah and University of Utah Hospital's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (in which plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company joined), defendant 
American Casualty Company of Reading PA's Motion for Summary Judgment, and American" 
Casualty's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lynn Faldmo came on for hearing before the Court 
on September 6, 2002. Following the hearing, St. Paul and American Casualty submitted 
supplemental briefing. 
Having heard oral argument and having read and considered all papers and supporting 
documents submitted in connection with the parties' motions, the Court issued a memorandum 
decision dated and signed October 7, 2002, wherein the Court granted American Casualty's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the University's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denied American Casualty's Motion to Strike. 
For the reasons set forth in the Court's October 7,2002 memorandum decision, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED 
FORTHWITH in favor of defendant American Casualty Company of Reading, PA and against 
plaintiffs the University of Utah and University Hospital and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance-
Company and that plaintiffs' lawsuit against American Casualty be dismissed with prejudice. 
s^s
 d a y o f if&z * 2002. 
)URT: 
DATED this 
The Honorable GlennTC 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an 
Illinois corporation, 
Defendant. 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE, COMPANY, a Minnesota 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, j 
vs. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
READING, PA and TROY ALAN 
BROKA, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No.980913150 
Hon. GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Cleric: Janet Banks 
October 4, 2002 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and American Casualty Company of 
Reading, PA's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Lynn 
Faldmo. The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions 
on September 6, 2002. Following the hearing, the Court granted the 
parties time for additional briefing. 
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The Court having received the additional briefing and 
considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits attached thereto and 
for the good cause shown hereby enters the following ruling. 
Addressing first the Motion to Strike, after reviewing the 
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of Ms. Faldmo, the Court is 
persuaded it is subject to appropriate exceptions to the hearsay 
rule and, further, any deficiencies with regard to personal 
knowledge have been cured. Accordingly, the motion is denied. 
Turning next to the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, the 
plaintiffs, University of Utah and University of Utah Hospital 
(collectively "the University") settled a claim brought by a widow, 
Susan Hepworth, whose husband died, allegedly due to a nurse's 
negligence. The University secured an agreement from Mrs. Hepworth 
releasing it and its agents and employees from all liability 
connected with the patient's death and paid $1 million of its own 
money to help settle the lawsuit.1 
With this Complaint, the University seeks subrogation and 
contribution. Specifically, the University seeks a ruling form 
this Court that American Casualty Company of Reading, PA 
("American") is the primary insurance policy covering the nurse, 
*The University's lawsuit was consolidated with a lawsuit 
brought by St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company against 
American. St. Paul also seeks reimbursement for monies it 
contributed to the settlement. 
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Troy Alan Broka ("Nurse Broka"), and that American is, therefore, 
primarily responsible for covering Nurse Broka, and, consequently, 
must reimburse the University for monies paid toward the 
settlement.2 
With their motion for summary judgment, the University asks 
this Court to Rule as a matter of law that American is Nurse 
• Broka's primary insurance carrier.3 Specifically, notes the 
University, American asserts the other insurance clause in the 
policy issued to Nurse Broka makes the policy excess to the 
University's self-insurance program.4 This is nonsensical, asserts 
the University, as Nurse Broka did not have his own self-insurance 
program and although the University has a self-insurance program, 
the clause does not state that it extends to "self-insurance 
2The University is self-insured for professional liability 
claims up to $1 million-when there is not insurance available to 
cover the particular claim. 
3 
'A determination of amount is not sought. 
"Section VII OTHER INSURANCE provides: 
If other valid and collectible insurance is 
available to you for a claim we cover under 
this policy, our obligations are limited as 
follows: 
Excess Insurance 
This insurance is excess over any other 
insurance, self-insurance, self-insured 
retention or similar programs, whether 
primary, excess, contingent or on any other 
basis. 
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programs of others." Indeed, argues the University, it never 
reviewed the policy and never agreed to act as Nurse Broka's 
primary liability insurance. 
Next, the University asserts American's interpretation of 
"other insurance" is overboard and renders the policy worthless as 
hospitals have risk allocation systems in place, whether through 
self-insurance programs or insurance policies and under American's 
view of the clause, it would never need to pay a claim against one 
of its insureds because the hospital that employed the nurse will 
always be self-insured or have its own insurance coverage. 
Moreover, it is the University's position that even if the 
"other insurance" clause is interpreted as American urges, the 
clause runs counter to public policy requiring an insurer to cover 
an insured when it bargained for the risk and received premium 
payments. Finally, contends the University, Utah courts will not 
enforce an insurance clause that serves to deprive the insured of 
coverage when the clause could not easily be found by the insured. 
American opposes the motion
 a n d brings its own motion for 
summary judgment arguing the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
controlling Utah case law, together, preclude Nurse Broka from 
incurring any personal liability for the underlying wrongful death 
matter and further prohibit the University or its insurer from 
seeking indemnification from the University's employees or their 
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employees' insurers in such circumstances.5 Moreover, argues 
American, it only insured Nurse Broka, who never had any monetary 
demands directly asserted against him by the underlying claimants.6 
Specifically, American notes that according to plaintiffs' 
complaint in this action, Nurse Broka negligently administered 
excess intravenous fluids to Mr. Hepworth, allegedly causing or 
contributing to Mr. Hepworth's death four days later. It is 
American's position, however, that plaintiffs have not alleged 
Nurse Broka was acting outside the course and scope of his duties 
in connection with those acts. Further, argues American, there 
were several other employees at the University who were potentially 
responsible for any excess administration of fluids or surrounding 
events. 
The University opposes. American's cross motion arguing the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not bar the University's claims for 
subrogation and equitable subrogation. Specifically, the 
University notes Utah Code Ann. §63-30-38 states that if a 
5Indeed, asserts American, allowing the University or St. Paul 
to recover from Nurse Broka's insurer, when they are barred by 
statute from recovering from Nurse Broka, would abrogate the 
purpose of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
*With respect to St. Paul, American contends it insured the 
University and all of its employees and the settlement was designed 
to cover every employee of the University who was involved in 
providing care to Mr. Hepworth. In sum, it is American's position 
St. Paul did no more than protect its own interests and those of 
its insureds by its participation in the Hepworth settlement. 
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governmental entity settles a claim against an employee, "the 
employee7' may not be required to indemnify the entity. This 
section, argues the University, does not say that the employee's 
private insurer does not need to indemnify the entity. Similarly, 
asserts the University, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-33(1) (c) states that 
a governmental entity's "insurer" has no right of indemnification 
or contribution from the employee. While the legislature was 
careful to protect employees from indemnifying their employer, it 
is the University's position they did not draft a provision 
preventing the governmental employer from seeking indemnification 
from the employee's insurer. Additionally, with respect to the 
cases cited by American, the University notes that none address the 
situation where insurer was a self-insured governmental body. 
Furthermore, argues the University, if American's 
interpretation of the Act were correct, the policy it provided to 
Nurse Broka would be worthless. Indeed, contends the University, 
American maintains that under the Act the University would be 
solely responsible for losses occasioned by its insured's 
negligence and that its policy would never be triggered because 
Nurse Broka supposedly would never be "legally obligated to pay" 
due to his employer's duty to indemnify him. According to the 
University, when American was initially invited to participate in 
the Hepworth settlement, they refused solely on the basis of the 
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"other insurance" exclusion in the policy. Consequently, argues 
the University, American waived any right to assert the 
Governmental Immunity Act as an excuse of its obligation to 
contribute. 
Finally, the University contends it does not matter that Mrs. 
Hepworth did not demand the money directly from Nurse Broka. 
Specifically, the University notes that its subrogation claim is 
against American, not Nurse Broka, and American was on notice from 
the outset that a third party was pursuing a claim arising from its 
insured's negligence.7 
St. Paul joins in the University's opposition and argues in 
addition that because both it and American insured Nurse Broka for 
the same risk, St. Paul is entitled to equitable contribution from 
American for its portion of the loss paid by St. Paul to the 
Hepworths. Indeed, notes St. Paul, its claim for equitable 
contribution (not subrogation) is
 n o t precluded by any argument 
that American stands in the shoes of Broka, because St. Paul is not 
required to stand in the shoes of the Hospital with respect to 
Broka's defense and, thus, becomes subject to the defense. The 
right of equitable contribution is not derivative and is not 
'It is the University's position American's duty does not 
depend upon Nurse Broka's receipt of a demand for money. Indeed, 
notes the University, the policy defines "claim" as "receipt by you 
incident'' " ^ " S e r V i C e S n 3 m i n g y O U a n d a 1 1 * ^ a medical 
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dependant upon anv riahts sna^^t- • J 
^
 y r i9 n c s agamst indemnity the Broka may have 
under the Act. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In considering a 
summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairh, ^ ..m -P 4-U 
1Les
 rairly drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." 
Cinder v. A.L. Wi 11 i WJU&S3SUU, 739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . 
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, it is 
important to note the University essentially concedes that the 
Hepworths made no "claim" within +-K~ • ^ *.,_ 
witnin the meaning of the American policy 
against Nurse Broka. This is critical as the American's policy is 
only triggered by a "claim" or an insured's legal obligation to pay 
some amount. In other worHc: M„, r. i 
uuner words, Nurse Broka never had any claims made 
against him and never became legally obligated to pay anything to 
the Hepworths in connection with the University's and St. Paul's 
settlement of the University's liability to the Hepworths. 
Accordingly, none of American's obligations under the policy it 
issued to Nurse Broka pwr ™^ *. J „ 
ever matured. Consequently, American is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
With respect to St Pa„i <-u 
^
L
- Paul, there can be no claim for 
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contribution among insurers „ni^ 
y insurers unless one insurer was equally 
obligated to provide coveraae 1-0 fho 
overage to the same insurer for the same 
risk, yet failed to do so Hor0 •.*,« u, • 
° so. Here the obligations triggered by the 
Hepworths' demands were those of K,0 n • • 
cnose of the University and its insurer, 
St. Paul, for amounts in excess of the University's retained limit. 
The Hepworth's made no demand that would have triggered the 
American policy. 
Based upon the forgolng, ^ s r i c a n . s M o t i o n f o r Sumary 
Judgment is
 g r a n t e d. consequently, the University's motion is, 
respectfully, denied.8 
DATED this _ 7 _ day of October, 2002. 
TLENN K.* IWASAKI 
DISTRICT COURT JU 
issue'of thfutah Governmental r ^ l ^ C ° U r t d ° e S n 0 t r e a c h t h e 
issues surrounding the Act ± m m u n i ty A ct, nor the const itutional 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Minnesota Corporation. ' 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA ; 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois 
Corporation, and Troy Alan Broka, ] 
Defendants. ' 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No.: 990908784 
Judge: Glenn K. Iwasaki 
For Claims against Defendants, Plaintiff alleges as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff is a Minnesota Corporation Licensed and qualified to do business as an insurance 
company in the State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Continental Casualty dba CNA Insurance Companies (hereinafter "CNA") is 
an Illinois corporation registered to do business, and doing business, as an insurance company in the 
State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Troy Alan Broka (hereinafter "Broka") is an individual who caused injury in 
the state of Utah as hereinafter alleged and who is subject to jurisdiction of this court as a resident 
of the state of Utah, or, as a non resident, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-24. 
4. Venue and jurisdiction are proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-13-4, 7, 
Section 31 A-l-105, and Section 78-3-4. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. Broka at all relevant times was employed by the University of Utah Hospital and the 
University of Utah (hereinafter collectively the "Hospital") as a travel nurse. 
6. At all relevant times, CNA provided nursing professional liability insurance to Broka, 
issued through American Casualty Company, which was in effect at all times material to the claims 
herein asserted. 
7. A copy of Broka's certificate for the aforementioned professional liability policy with 
CNA is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
8. Broka's professional liability coverage provided limits of liability, in the event of a claim 
arising from the rendering of professional nursing services by Broka, in the amounts of $1,000,000 
for each medical incident and $3,000,000 aggregate. 
9. Broka's CNA policy provided professional liability coverage to him for, among other 
things, injury or damages caused by a medical incident arising out of care provided by Broka. 
2 
10. At all relevant times, Plaintiff provided the Hospital with excess liability insurance 
coverage above a $1,000,000 per occurrence self retention amount. 
11. While working in the Hospital, Broka provided nursing care to Abel Hepworth, who 
was admitted on April 10, 1997 for surgical repair of an aneurysm in a cerebral artery. 
12. In providing care to Mr. Hepworth, Broka negligently misread a physician's order for 
the infusion of IV fluids and infused Mr. Hepworth with an excessive amount of fluids at 500cc. per 
hour instead of the 100 cc. Per hour ordered by the physician. 
13. As a result of a fluid overload suffered by Mr. Hepoworth from such incorrect 
administration of fluids, Mr. Heepworth died on April 14, 1997. 
14. Shortly following the death of Mr. Hepworth, the Hospital was informed by his wife, 
Susan Hepworth, acting individually and on behalf of the Hep worths' minor children, Alex Hepworth 
and Ammon Hepworth (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Hepworths"), that she intended 
to commence a lawsuit against the Hospital based on the care provided to her husband by Broka; 
specifically, the excessive administration of fluids. 
15. Prior to commencing a lawsuit, Mrs. Hepworth initiated settlement negotiations with the 
Hospital. 
16. On or about June 11,1997, counsel for the Hospital informed CNA of the aforementioned 
facts involving Broka and invited CNA's participation in the settlement negotiations with Mrs. 
Hepworth. 
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17. By letter of July 17, 1997, CNA declined to participate in settlement negotiations. 
18. On or about July 10, 1997, counsel for the Hospital tendered the defense and 
indemnification of Broka to CNA. CNA did not respond. 
19. Because Broka was an agent of the Hospital and because his negligence caused Mr. 
Hepworth's death, the Hepworths' claims were subsequently settled by the Hospital and Plaintiff. 
20. As a part of such settlement, the University paid the Hepworths $ 1,000,000, and Plaintiff 
paid them $323,523. 
21. The settlement amounts paid to the Hepworths were paid as a result of and arising out 
of the negligent care rendered by Broka. 
CLAIM ONE 
(Subrogation - Breach of Duty to Defend-CNA) 
22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the foregoing paragraphs 1 
through 21 inclusive. 
23. By CNA's failure to participate in the settlement and failure to defend Broka against the 
aforementioned claims, CNA breached the duty arising under its policy to defend Broka. 
24. Because CNA breached its duty to defend Broka, the Hospital and Plaintiff paid such 
defense costs, and PlaintifFis therefore subrogated and entitled to recover defense costs incurred and 
paid by it, plus interest, from CNA. 
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25. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against CNA for the costs and attorneys' 
fees of Plaintiffs participation in negotiating and defending the Hepworths' claims arising out of the 
care provided by Broka in an amount to be proven at trial, with interest thereon at the legal rate. 
CLAIM TWO 
(EQUITABLE SUBROGATION- CNA) 
26. Plantiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the foregoing paragraphs 1 
through 21 inclusive. 
27. By CNA's failure to participate in the settlement and failure to defend Broka against the 
aforementioned claims, CNA failed to comply with its policy provisions requiring it to pay all 
amounts up to policy limits for which Broka became legally obligated to pay as a result of injuries 
caused by a medical incident arising from care provided by Broka. 
28. Because CNA breached its duty to pay such amounts, Plaintiff is subrogated to and 
entitled to recover from CNA the $323,523 paid by Plaintiff to the Hepworths, plus interest thereon 
at the legal rate. 
29. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to judgment against CNA in the amount of $323,523, 
with interest thereon at the legal rate. 
CLAIM THREE 
(CONTRIBUTION-CNA) 
30. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by this reference the foregoing paragraphs 1 
through 21, inclusive. 
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31. CNA and Plaintiff both provided liability insurance coverage to Broka. 
32. CNA's insurance provided first dollar coverage of $1,000,000 per occurrence, while 
Plaintiffs insurance provided coverage for liability only in excess of $1,000,000. 
3 3. CNA had the primary obligation to pay the first $ 1,000,000 of the Hepworth settlement. 
34. If CNA had paid the first $ 1,000,000 of the Hepworth settlement, there would have been 
no remaining liability for Plaintiff to pay after such payment by CNA and partial liquidation of and 
payment from the Hospital's retention amount. 
35. By payment of a portion of the Hepworth settlement, Plaintiff has discharged $323,523 
of an obligation that, under the circumstances of coverage provided by Plaintiff and by CNA, Plaintiff 
was not required to pay, and all of such payment was the obligation of CNA. 
36. CNA is thus required to contribute to Plaintiff the entire $323,523 paid by Plaintiff, plus 
interest thereon at the legal rate. 
CLAIM FOUR 
(SUBROGATION - BROKA) 
37. Plaintiff reassets and includes herein by reference the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 
21 inclusive. 
38. Pursuant to and in conformity with its insurance coverage of the Hopsital, Plaintiff has 
paid $323,523 to the Hepworths that was the obligation of Broka arising from his negligent and 
improper treatment of Abel Hepworth. 
39. Having paid such amount and obligation on behalf of the Hospital, Plaintiff, through its 
arrangements with the Hospital, became subrogated to the Hospital's right to recover the amount 
6 
from Broka. 
40. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Broka for $323,523 plus interest 
thereon at the legal rate. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. Against CN A under Claim One for reimbursement of Plaintiff s defense costs in an amount 
to be proven at trial, together with interest thereon at the legal rate; 
2. Against CNA under Claim Two for $323,523, together with interest thereon at the legal 
rate; 
3. Against CNA under Claim Three for $323,523, together with interest thereon at the legal 
rate; 
4. Against Broka under Claim Four for $323,523, together with interest thereon at the legal 
rate; and 
5. Against CNA and Broka for Plaintiffs costs herein incurred and such other relief, 
including attorneys' fees, as is just and appropriate or the right to which may be established at trial. 
DATED this /%Xday of August, 1999. 
CROWTHER & GARDNER 
By ///I*'?*0**0* 
Thomas N. Crowther 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
P.O. Box 5000 
Brea, California 92822-5000 
t'U ££-i^£^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Amended Complaint was served upon Defendant by mailing a copy thereof, 
postage pre-paid, to Henry E. Heath at Sixth Floor Boston Building, Nine Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, this 18th day of October, 1999. 
CROWTHER& GARDNER, PC. 
Thomas N. Crowther 
R 
